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1 Introduction
Stephen Turnovsky’s graduate textbook Methods of Macroeconomic Dynamics made
a powerful mark on the field of macroeconomics by providing crucial building blocks
and useful applications of general equilibrium intertemporal dynamic macroeconomic
models. A notable oﬀspring of such dynamics methods is a class of models employing
multi-sectoral dynamics in a long-run growth context, also developed by Turnovsky
(and coauthors; including, among may others, Fisher and Turnovsky, 1998; Eicher
and Turnovsky 1999a,b, 2001; Alvarez-Cuadrado, Monteiro and Turnovsky, 2004;
and Turnovsky, 2004), which has been the cornerstone of an entire research agenda
which to this date is vibrant and keeps branching out to new applications of macro-
economics.
This paper uses dynamic general equilibrium and computational methods that we
first discovered as junior assistant professors studying Turnovsky’s book and extends
our earlier work (Papageorgiou and Perez-Sebastian, 2004; 2006; 2007) inspired by
the multi-sector growth model structure in Turnovsky’s previous and more recent
work. More specifically, the goal of this paper is to construct a model that can unify
two of the traditional explanations of the structural transformation; namely sector-
biased technical change pioneered by Ngai and Pissarides (2007), and non-homothetic
preferences pioneered by Konsamut et al. (2001). The importance of integrating both
approaches is defended and left to future research by, for example, Acemoglu (2008).
A well-documented feature of modern growth commonly called structural change
or structural transformation is the decline of agriculture and the rise of services.1
Structural transformation has been studied extensively, resulting in two prominent
albeit divergent theories.2 The first one is based on consumer non-homothetic prefer-
ences pioneered by Konsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001). The second builds on sector-
biased technical change and is represented by the influential contributions of Baumol
(1967) and Ngai and Pissarides (2007).
1This reallocation process has been documented by early pioneer contributions including Clark
(1940), Kuznets (1957), and Chenery (1960).
2See e.g., Kuznets (1966) and Baumol (1967), Echevarria (1997), Parente et al. (2000), Caselli
and Coleman (2001), and Strulik and Weisdorf (2008).
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Konsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001) were the first to present a model consistent with
both the Kaldor facts of constant growth rate, capital-output ratio, real rate of return
to capital, and input shares in national income, and the dynamics of sectoral labor
reallocation. These authors pioneered a model in which balanced growth is consistent
with structural change. These authors assumed a preference specification consistent
with the income elasticity of demand less than one for agricultural goods, equal to
one for manufacturing goods, and greater than one for services. Their additional
assumption of non-homothetic preferences was suﬃcient, for on otherwise standard
neoclassical model, to allow for structural change.
An alternative theory of structural change is based on the technological hypoth-
esis, proposed by Baumol (1967) and formalized by Ngai and Pissarides (2007) who
develop a formal framework that builds on the response of hours of work to the
uneven distribution of technological change across production sectors. They show
that if there are two sectors, one of them characterized by a larger total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP) growth, hours of work rises in the stagnant sector if the two goods
have a relatively large degree of complementarity; labor moves in the direction of the
progressive sector otherwise.
An important conclusion from the above literature is that biased technical change
has more weight on the explanation of the structural transformation than non-
homothetic preferences (see Ngai and Pissarides 2007, and Buera and Kaboski 2009).3
In this paper, we examine whether a more general approach with endogenous inno-
vation can encompass both of these influential theories of structural transformation,
and whether the conclusion holds in it.
In particular, we first ask whether the sector-biased technical change hypothesis
can follow from the non-homothetic preferences hypothesis. We examine the idea that
freeing labor from agriculture to feed other economic sectors might require a larger
total factor productivity (TFP) growth in agriculture; and that, as a consequence,
biased TFP growth could be an endogenous response to the non-homotheticity of the
3 Iscan (2010) presents quantitative results that suggest that non-homothetic preferences had a
larger weight in the structural transformation in the early stages of the process, but that in the last
70 years the main engine has been the technological biased. In Iscan’s model, technical change is
exogenous.
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utility function. Second, the paper searches for features of technological change that
can be responsible for the observed evolution of sectoral TFP.
In order to accomplish these goals, we build a multisector overlapping-generations
model of endogenous technical-change and economic growth. The production side of
the economy feeds from Romer (1990) and Jones (1995). The setup shows expanding-
varieties of intermediate goods that are designed using sector-specific R&D technolo-
gies. Production is disaggregated into two activities: agriculture, and non-agriculture.
Preferences are non-homothetic. We formalize the notion that inventors decide the
kind of technological improvements that they create. The paper is then also related
to the literature on directed technical change such as Acemoglu (2002, 2003). But
unlike these papers, we focus on ideas directed to diﬀerent sectors instead of diﬀerent
inputs.
A setup in which R&D technologies are symmetric across sectors is first consid-
ered. Results imply that the sector-biased technical change hypothesis can not follow
from non-homothetic preferences only, because the latter hypothesis generates both
larger TFP growth and labor inflows in the same sector, irrespective of the elasticity
of substitution between final goods. To generate reasonable dynamics, the long-run
value of TFP in agriculture needs to be larger than in other sectors. This is prevented
in our base model by the lower weight of agricultural-goods consumption in the utility
function. We then modify the R&D technologies to consider that agriculture benefits
from cross-sector knowledge spillovers. The resulting model predictions are now able
to reproduce the main patterns of TFP growth observed in the data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic
model. Its predictions are analyzed in section 3. Section 4 presents results in the
case where the R&D technologies allow for cross-sector knowledge spillovers. Section
5 concludes.
3
2 The Model
2.1 Households
We consider an economy composed of overlapping generations of individuals. The size
of generation t is Lt, and grows exogenously at rate n. Individuals have preferences
over consumption of agricultural and non-agricultural goods. They are endowed with
one unit of labor when young that is inelastically supplied to the production activities.
For simplicity, we assume that consumption only occurs in the second period of
life, thus abstracting from consumption/saving decisions.4 At time t, a representative
consumer is solving the following problem:
max
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
v(cat+1, cnt+1) =
⎡
⎣X
i=a,n,
γi(cit+1 − c¯i)(ε−1)/ε
⎤
⎦
ε/(ε−1)
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
,
subject to
Pat+1cat+1 + cnt+1 = (1 + rt+1)wt;
where ε ∈ (0,∞); cat and cnt are consumption at date t of the agricultural and non-
agricultural products, respectively;5 r and w are the rental rates of capital and labor;
Pat is the price of agricultural goods; γa + γn = 1; finally, c¯i represents a minimum
subsistence-consumption level if positive, or a minimum endowment level if negative.
All prices in the model are expressed in units of the non-agricultural goods. The
right-hand side of the budget constrain reflects equality between interest rate and
the return to capital.
The first-order conditions to this problem provide the optimal weights in the
consumption bundle as follows:µ
Pat
γa
¶ε
(cat − c¯a) =
µ
1
γn
¶ε
(cnt − c¯n).
4This should not have any impact on our results because saving only aﬀects the total amount of
capital, whereas our findings are driven by diﬀerences in the allocation of resources between the two
sectors. Capital is not an important determinant of these diﬀerences given our assumption that the
elasticity of capital is the same in the agriculture and non-agriculture production functions.
5Having three sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and services, instead of two, would
complicate matters without adding a significant change to the basic message of the paper.
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A larger weight in the utility function or a lower price contribute to increase demand
for that good.
2.2 Final-good production
A large number of firms produce goods using labor and capital, while each firm pro-
duces output Yit only in one sector i, with i ∈ {a, n}. At date t, capital employed is
composed of a mass Ait of diﬀerentiated producer durables. The production technol-
ogy is given by:
Yit = L1−αit
Z Ait
0
[xit(z)]α dz; (1)
where xit(z) and Lit are the amounts of equipment type z and labor employed by
sector i in period t.
Firms choose the amount of each type of capital good that they want to buy, and
the amount of labor that they want to hire so as to maximize profits. They solve the
following problem:
max
{xit(z),Lit}
½
PitL1−αit
Z Ait
0
[xit(z)]α dz −
Z Ait
0
pit(z)xit(z) dz − wt Lit
¾
;
where pit(z) is the price of durable good type z specific to sector i.
Solving this problem obtains the inverse demand functions:
xit(z) =
µ
αPit
pit(z)
¶1/(1−α)
Lit, (2)
Lit = (1− α)
PitYit
wt
. (3)
2.3 Intermediate-goods production
Technology (1) employs diﬀerent types of capital goods. The manufacturing process of
these goods requires investing raw capital coming from saved manufacturing output.
We adopt the simplest technology to manufacture capital products: one unit of capital
can be converted at no cost into one unit of any variety of intermediate goods. Firms
that produce the varieties hold exclusive property rights on the designs, which allows
5
them to practice monopoly pricing. We assume that these property rights expire in
one generation.6 Capital also depreciates fully after one generation.
The problem of a firm that produces variety j for sector i is:
max
xit(j)
[pit(j)− (1 + rt)]xit(j);
where pit(j) is given by the inverse demand function of intermediate good xit(j),
that is, by equation (2). The monopolist charges a markup η equal to the inverse of
the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods in final output production.
More specifically, the optimal decision, standard in the literature, is given by:
pit(j) = ηi(1 + rt) = pit, with ηi =
1
α
= η, ∀j. (4)
Since the price is the same for all varieties of intermediate goods, and they enter
symmetrically in final-good production, the amount demanded for each of them will
also be the same, xi(j) = xi ∀j. Profits then equal:
πit(j) = (η − 1) (1 + rt)xit = πit, also ∀j; (5)
2.4 R&D sector
Under the assumption of free entry into the R&D activity, there is a continuum of
firms that invest in deliberate R&D eﬀort directed to create sector-specific varieties
of intermediate goods. These firms rent labor supplied by young individuals at the
beginning of period t. Researchers benefit from the existing knowledge base Ait
to prospect for new designs. The total number of ideas specific to sector i, with
i = {a, n}, that the R&D activity delivers by the end of the period is given by
Ait+1 = μA
φ
itL
λ−1
Ait LAit ; (6)
where LAit is the number of workers employed in R&D directed to sector i.
There are several features of this R&D specification that are worth emphasizing.
First, the LHS is not written in increments, as most of the literature does, but in
levels. This is, however, consistent with the idea that technological levels can not
6 If one generation is 30 years. This implies a depreciation rate of ideas of about 10%, figure
consistent with the evidence provided by Caballero and Jaﬀe (1993).
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decrease. The reason is that, even though innovations can not depreciate, they can
become obsolete. This is what occurs every single period in our model. In particular,
as in Jones and Williams (2000), we assume that new generations of inventions come
in packages. A package is composed of both upgrades of old capital designs and
completely new ones. The key is that the whole new vintage or package of ideas
(Ait+1) has to be adopted together, which displaces the old one (Ait).
Under the above assumption, expression (6) is correct as long as Ait+1 ≥ Ait.
This always true in our simulations. In addition, the adoption of the new package,
besides bringing technological upgrades, needs to be profitable — notice that producers
could continue using old designs purchased in perfectly competitive markets because
patents last for one period. The appendix shows that the new vintage will be adopted
if and only if the markup ηi charged by monopolists is below (Ait/Ait−1)(1−α)/α. For
the shake of simplicity, we do not impose this condition. However, as will become
clear later, this should not have any eﬀect on the main results of the paper. The
reason being that the markup and the rate of technical change reinforce each other in
the same direction when the condition is binding. As a result, the main consequence
of a markup that followed TFP growth would be an amplification of the cross-sector
diﬀerences in TFP growth.
Second, returns to labor at the individual and aggregate levels diﬀer. On the one
hand, investment displays constant returns at the individual level. On the other, the
term Lλ−1Ait implies that researchers generate negative externalities to each other. This
can be a consequence of patent races for example. The result is that the R&D tech-
nology at the aggregate level shows diminishing returns (0 < λ < 1) to R&D eﬀort.
More specifically, in the symmetric equilibrium in which firms end up, expression (6)
becomes:
Ait+1 = μA
φ
itL
λ
Ait .
Finally, the R&D specification allows for intertemporal knowledge spillovers (0 <
φ < 1).
After coming up with new innovations, inventors obtain patents that are imme-
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diately sold.7 Those that purchase them invest capital at the end of date t to build
producer-durable units that will be available for final-goods manufacturing at t + 1
at monopoly prices. The outcome of this entire process is that the firm that sells the
intermediate goods obtains an amount of profits equal to πit, given by expression (5).
The solution to the R&D allocation problem is characterized by the next two
conditions:
QitAit+1 = wtLAit , (7)
Qit =
πit+1
1 + rt+1
= (η − 1)xit+1. (8)
Free entry implies that total revenues from the sale of designs at the end of the period
must equal the cost of R&D. Calling Qit the price of the patent, we then get the non-
arbitrage condition given by expression (7). Intermediate-goods producers will buy
the patent and produce under monopolistic competition next period if the price of
the patent does not exceed the present value of expected profits. But in equilibrium
they must be indiﬀerent between producing and not, so condition (8) must also hold.
2.5 Market clearing and aggregate outcomes
The agricultural sector produces output that is used for final consumption, while the
non-agricultural sector generates output that can be used for final consumption and
saved as capital. Hence, market clearing in goods markets requires:
Yat = Lt−1cat, (9)
and
Ynt = Lt−1cnt + It; (10)
where It is gross investment in capital at time t.
Let us now focus on input markets. Labor is supplied inelastically by consumers,
therefore in equilibrium
Lt =
X
i=a,n
Lit +
X
i=a,n
LAit . (11)
7We assume that there exist institutions that guarantee such a thing.
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Saving in our model economy is entirely due to salary income, and is employed to
construct physical capital and finance the purchase of patents:
wtLt = Kt+1 +
X
i=a,n
QitAit+1. (12)
In the last equality, Kt represents the aggregate capital stock in the economy at
time t. Since producer durables fully depreciate upon use, it follows that:
It−1 =
X
i=a,n
∙Z Ait
0
xit(z) dz
¸
=
X
i=a,n
Aitxit = Kt. (13)
In turn, the capital stock in sector i can be written as Kit =
R Ait
0 xit(z) dz = Aitxit.
Furthermore, given that prices and use of intermediate goods are the same within
both sectors, we can rewrite equation (1) at the aggregate level as:
Yit = (AitLit)1−αKαit = Lit A
1−α
it k
α
it; (14)
where kit gives the capital labor ratio Kit/Lit in sector i at date t.
This expression, and optimality conditions (2)-(4) imply that:
1 + rt =
α
η
PitA1−αit k
α−1
it , (15)
wt = (1− α)PitA1−αit kαit. (16)
Then
kat = knt,
and
Pat =
µ
Ant
Aat
¶1−α
.
Defining kt = Kt/Lt, it follows from (13) that:
(lat + lnt) kit = kt. (17)
From (7), (8) and (12), we get:
kt+1 (1 + n) (η − 1) = wt (lAat + lAnt) , (18)
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In turn, equations (7), (8), (11), (12) and (18) deliver kit = ηkt. An implication of all
the above is that the ratio of the output shares equals the ratio of the labor shares:
Patyatlat
yntlnt
=
lat
lnt.
. (19)
2.6 The equation system
The following equations, along with (15) and (16), provide the system that charac-
terizes dynamics in this economy as a function of prices and predetermined stocks:µ
Pat
γa
¶ε
(cat − c¯a) =
µ
1
γn
¶ε
(cnt − c¯n),
Ait+1 = μA
φ
it [lAitLt]
λ ,
kt+1 (1 + n) + wt (lAat + lAnt) = wt,
Pat+1cat+1 + cnt+1 = (1 + rt+1)wt,
yatlat =
cat
1 + n
,
yntlnt =
cnt
1 + n
+ kt+1 (1 + n) ,
yit = A1−αit k
α
t lit,
lat + lnt + lAat + lAnt = 1,
lat+1
lnt+1
lAnt
lAat
= 1,
knt
kt
= η;
where lit and lAit are the fractions of the labor force in the final goods and R&D of
sector i at date t, respectively.
The above system simplifies to:
Ait+1 = μA
φ
it [lAntLt]
λ , (20)
Pat =
µ
Ant
Aat
¶1−α
, (21)
(cnt − c¯n)
X
i=a,n
P 1−εit
µ
γi
γn
¶ε
+
X
i=a,n
Pit c¯i = α2A1−αnt (ηkt)
α (1 + n), (22)
10
kt+1 =
α (1− α)wt
(1 + n)
, (23)
lat =
P−εat
³
γa
γn
´ε £
α2A1−αnt (kt/α)
α (1 + n)− c¯n
¤
+ c¯ah
1 + P 1−εat
³
γa
γn
´εi
A1−αat (kt/α)
α (1 + n)
, (24)
lnt = α− lat, (25)
lAat =
µ
1
α
− 1
¶
lat+1, (26)
lAnt = (1− α)− lAat , (27)
Lt/Lt−1 = 1 + n; (28)
with kt, Ait, Lt being predetermined.
3 Dynamics of Structural Change
The observed change in the contribution of the primary sector to GDP in the last
200 years has been impressive. The share of agriculture in US national income, for
example, went down from roughly 20% in 1850 to around 0.7% in year 2000. At the
same time, growth of TFP has been higher in farming than in the rest of the economy
in the last 90 years. This pattern of relative TFP growth is supported by data on the
relative price of agricultural goods. In particular, evidence suggests that the relative
price of agricultural goods rose over the period 1880 to 1920 and declined after that.8
This section carries out numerical experiments to analyze the transitional dynam-
ics of the model. Our goal is to see whether the unified theory can reproduce these
stylized facts and, therefore, encompass the two traditional explanations of the struc-
tural transformation. But first, we need to give values to the diﬀerent parameters,
and decide on the starting point of the simulation. For this, we will employ the very
long-run equilibrium towards which variables converge.
3.1 Unbalanced growth and the asymptotic steady state
Ours is an unbalanced growth model because of the non-homotheticity of preferences.
As Kongsamut et al. (2001) show in this framework, variables only reach a constant
8See, for example, Caselli and Coleman (2001), Kongsamut et al. (2001), and Johnson (2002).
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growth rate in the particular case that c¯a(Pat/γa)ε = c¯n(1/γn)ε. In all other scenarios,
variables approach and get infinitely close to the balanced-growth path associated
with the zero subsistence-consumption case.
When c¯a = c¯m = 0, per capita variables and wages grow at the same rate along
the balanced-growth path, and this rate equals the rate of technological change. The
rest of the variables, and in particular, the labor shares, the price of agricultural
goods, and the interest rate remain constant.
Specifically, let Gz be the gross growth rate of variable z, and eliminate the
time index to denote steady-state values. Clearing conditions (9)-(13) imply that
GYa = GcaGL, GYn = GcnGL = GK , and GLa = GLn = GLAa = GLAn = 1 + n.
Equations (20) and (21) imply that Pat remains constant at steady state because
GAa = GAn = (1 + n)λ/(1−φ).
Equation (14) then implies that GYi = GAi . Finally, given the output aggregate
Yt = PatYat + Ynt, we obtain that
Gy = (1 + n)λ/(1−φ); (29)
where y is per capita income.
Table 1: Benchmark parameter values
λ 0.50 γa 0.00004 ca 0.05 α 0.66
φ 0.75 n 0.0130 cm 0 ε 0.5
3.2 Calibration
Table 1 shows the parameter values chosen. An intermediate value is assigned to
the degree of diminishing returns to R&D eﬀort, λ = 0.5. The very long-run gross
growth rate of per capita income Gy is equalized to 1.8113; which is the consequence
of growing annually at a 2 percent during one period or 30 years. The annual growth
rate of the population is assumed to be 1 percent, thus implying for the same reason
that n = 0.3478. By equation (29), all these values require that the intertemporal
knowledge-spillover parameter φ equals 0.75.
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We think of capital broadly composed of physical as well as human capital com-
ponents, and therefore choose the capital share α = 0.66. The value of the elasticity
of substitution between consumption goods is taken from Buera and Kaboski (2009),
ε = 0.5. The minimum-consumption requirement c¯a is equalized to 0.05, and c¯n to
0. For the weights of the two types of consumption in the utility function, we use
the fact that agricultural GDP as a share of total GDP in 2002 was 0.7 percent, as
compiled by the Economic Research Service the USDA using data from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis. This share implies, in turn, by equations (9), (10), (19) and
(23) that γa = 0.00004.
To choose initial values of the state variables, we assume that the economy begins
from a steady state in which cat = c¯a, cmt = 0, n = 0, GAt = 1, and the markup
that intermediate goods producers are able to charge is very small, namely η =
1/0.997.9 This could be a consequence of a poorly developed patent-enforcement
system. Equations (9) and (22) then require that la0 = α/η. Then, labor market
clearing and expression (20) give that Pa0 = (1/α − 1)λ(1−α)/(1−φ), (23) that k0 =
Pa0c¯a(1−α)/[α(1+n)2], and equation (9) that Aa0 = [c¯a/(αηα−1kαt )]1/(1−α). Finally,
expression (20) provides Am0 and μLλ0 .
3.3 Results
Figure 1 presents the adjustment paths for consumption shares (top panel), output
shares (middle panel), and TFP growth (bottom panel) for the parameter values and
starting coordinates described above. Because expression (19) implies that relative
labor shares exactly equal relative output shares, the labor shares are not shown.
The simulation begins in a stagnant economy with a relatively large share of
agriculture in GDP of 66 percent, and an even larger share of agricultural goods in
total consumption of 100 percent. The shocks that provoke the transition are an
exogenous increase in the population growth rate from zero to 1 percent, and the
9Our starting point resembles a Malthusian stage characterized by economic stagnation, zero
population growth, and relatively low levels of R&D activity. The model, however, does not attempt
to explain the Malthusian world; the model is one of modern growth in which R&D eﬀort propels
innovation and growth. Some features of the Malthusian economy are used as a simple way to obtain
the initial coordinates.
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Figure 1: Dynamic paths for consumption shares (top), output shares (middle) and
TFP growth (bottom)
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establishment of a strong paten system that allows firms charging their preferred
markup η = 1/α. This is what allows the growth of TFP.
At impact TFP growth achieves its largest values, and then progressively de-
creases. Higher population is able to generate more ideas, and output and consump-
tion shares start their transition towards an economy in which non-agriculture is the
most important activity. The transition is monotonic and relatively fast. The one
of output and consumption is almost finished after 7 generations, while that one of
TFP growth is still alive after 10.
The fact that the weight of the primary sector in total GDP declines and the
one of the non-agriculture rises as the economy develops is a consequence of the
non-homotheticity of preferences, and reproduces a main pattern of the structural
transformation. The evolution of TFP, however, is not consistent with the facts.
Non-agriculture TFP growth in the model economy is always the fastest, although
agriculture eventually converges to the productivity growth rates of the rest of the
economy. The predicted patterns do not depend on the value of c¯a nor on the value
of ε. In particular, changes in c¯a are fully neutral, whereas increases in the elasticity
of consumption-goods substitution only cause the convergence path to be slightly
smoother.
These findings suggest that non-homothetic preferences per se can not account
for the evolution of TFP. An alternative is that factors specific to the production
technology contribute to the structural transformation. Next we investigate whether
diﬀerences in the intensity of cross-sector knowledge spillovers can help reconcile our
theory with the facts.
4 Cross-Sector Knowledge Spillovers
Let us now consider that the agricultural sector benefits from spillovers coming from
the rest of the economy, in line with evidence provided, for example, by Johnson and
Evenson (1999). These authors argue that R&D spillovers are significant contributors
to agricultural productivity growth and that, in particular, sectors such as chemicals,
machinery, plastics, fabricated metals, and electric products contribute to it. The
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agricultural R&D technology now takes the form:
Aat+1 = μA
φ
atA
β
ntL
λ
Aat ; (30)
where β > 0 is the spillover parameter.
It is easy to show that the system of equations that characterize the model dynam-
ics remains the same with the exception of the new R&D technology that produces
ideas specific to the primary sector. In particular, the system is now composed of
conditions (20) with i = n, (21) to (28), and (30).
A diﬀerence compared to the previous scenario is that the price is no longer
approaching a constant value because it decreases with Aat. This feature of the
model implies that, with spillovers, variables approach a balanced growth path only
if ε = 1; but for ε = 0.5, no such reference exists. This lead us to maintaining the
calibrated parameters as in Table 1.
To determine the size of the spillover parameter, we look at Bernard and Jones
(1996, Table 1) who estimated TFP growth in the agricultural sector during the pe-
riod 1970-1987 to be double that of the industrial sector. To reproduce this diﬀerence
between agriculture and non-agriculture in our model after 10 periods, we assign a
value β = 0.214.
The computation of the initial values for the diﬀerent state variables follows the
same logic as above. A steady-state equilibrium with cat = c¯a, cnt = 0, n = 0, and
η = 1/0.997 still exists, although showing that needs a bit more algebra. Equations
(9) and (22) again give la0 = α/η. In turn, combining expressions (10), (20), and
(23) obtains
k0 =
⎧
⎨
⎩
"µ
1− α
α
¶ λ
1−φ ³ c¯a
α
´ 1
1−α
η
# 1
1+β/(1−φ)
(1− α)
1
1−α
η
⎫
⎬
⎭
1
1+ α1−α
1
1+β/(1−φ)
.
Knowing k0, we can easily recover An0, Aa0, and μLλ0 .
Results for consumption shares, output shares and TFP growth are presented in
the top, middle and bottom charts of Figure 2, respectively. Starting again from a
relatively large share of agriculture in GDP of 66 percent, an exogenous increase in
the population growth rate from zero to 1 percent, and in the markup from 1/0.997
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Figure 2: Dynamic paths for consumption shares (top), output shares (middle) and
TFP growth (bottom), case with spillovers
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to 1/0.66 triggers structural transformation and the transition to positive economic
growth. The model shows again the highest TFP growth rates at impact, monoton-
ically decreasing after that point. As technology starts improving, the weight of
farming in total GDP declines, while the weight of non-agriculture rises. However
unlike in the case without spillovers, TFP growth in agriculture is below that for
non-agriculture only temporarily. After some periods, technological change in farm-
ing becomes the fastest. These trends are consistent with the main patterns observed
in the data.
Regarding comparative dynamics (not shown but available upon request), the
elasticity of substitution has an impact although relatively small. As ε rises, conver-
gence becomes a bit slower, and long-run diﬀerences in TFP growth between the two
sectors become larger. Subsistence consumption requirements, on the other hand,
have a significant eﬀect when spillovers are present. In particular, the transition
becomes faster as c¯a rises, and diﬀerences in TFP growth between the activities get
larger.
5 Conclusion
Stephen Turnovsky’s work on multi-sector growth models has inspired a vibrant lit-
erature that is growing strong to this day. This paper extends this line of research
by using dynamic general equilibrium and computational methods, in an attempt to
develop a theory that unifies two of the traditional explanations of structural change:
sector-biased technical change, and non-homothetic preferences. More specifically,
we build a multisector overlapping-generations growth model that incorporates both
endogenous technical-change and non-homothetic preferences. Following a minimal-
ist approach, the model is based on an expanding-variety setup with only two types
of R&D technologies; one for agriculture, and the other for non-agriculture.
We first ask whether homothetic preferences can be the cause of the observed evo-
lution of sectoral TFP that represents the basic element of the sector-biased technical
change hypothesis. The analysis shows that this is not possible. Our baseline model,
in which cross-sector diﬀerences come from only consumer preferences, predicts that
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agriculture is the most stagnant activity, a prediction not consistent with evidence.
We then ask a follow-up question: What kind of diﬀerences between sectors can
be responsible for TFP growth? When we consider knowledge spillovers from the
rest of the economy into agricultural R&D, the model is able to reproduce evolution
of consumption shares, output shares, and TFP growth in agriculture and in non-
agriculture consistent with evidence. We therefore conclude that production-side
specific factors, such as asymmetries in cross-sector knowledge spillovers, are needed
to reconcile the model with the main patterns observed in the data.
Although directed technical change can reconcile the two traditional theories of
structural transformation, our findings depart from the sector-biased technical change
hypothesis in one crucial way. The evolution of TFP does not need to be linked to
a relatively low elasticity of consumption-goods substitution to be consistent with
structural transformation. Endogenous technical change allows the agricultural sector
to shift from being the most stagnant to being the most vibrant sector, therefore
freeing labor to the rest of the economy, irrespective of the value of the elasticity of
substitution.
It is also interesting to note that our finding highlighting the need for cross-sector
variability and knowledge spillover eﬀects is the main research topic in a related
literature that tries to explain cross-country growth variation by examining sectoral
resource (mis)allocations and their eﬀects on aggregate TFP (see e.g. Restuccia and
Rogerson, 2008, and Hsieh and Klenow, 2009).
We conclude with a cautionary remark. Our analysis provides the simplest pos-
sible disaggregated setup to consider a unified theory of structural transformation.
More complicated multisector models are likely to be more successful in matching
the data. For example, we believe that further work could look at even more disag-
gregated setups, and search for sectoral asymmetries in manufacturing and services.
Recent emphasis on producing more and better quality data at the sectoral level
should provide further incentives to extend the analysis in this paper further.
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A Restricted markup
All available designs become displaced by updates after one period. A final good
producer at t can purchase the varieties Ait−1 at the marginal cost price or buy the
new cluster Ait of intermediate goods at markup price. The profits of a producer of
final goods in each case are, respectively,
Πoldit = x
old
it
"
(1 + rt)Ait−1
µ
1
α
− 1
¶
− wt
µ
(1 + rt)
αPit
¶ 1
1−α
#
,
Πnewit = x
new
it
"
ηit (1 + rt)Ait
µ
1
α
− 1
¶
− wt
µ
ηit (1 + rt)
αPit
¶ 1
1−α
#
.
It follows that the final good producer will adopt the new technology if and only if
ηit ≤
µ
Ait
Ait−1
¶ 1−α
α
.
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